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Abstract— Today, internet and web services have become an 
inseparable part of our lives. Hence, ensuring continuous 
availability of service has become imperative to the success of any 
organization. But these services are often hampered by constant 
threats from myriad types of attacks. One such attack is called 
distributed denial of service attack that results in issues ranging 
from temporary slowdown of servers to complete non-availability 
of service. Honeypot, which is a sort of a trap, can be used to 
interact with potential attackers to deflect, detect or prevent such 
attacks and ensure continuous availability of service. This paper 
gives insights into the problems posed by distributed denial of 
service attacks, existing solutions that use honeypots and how a 
mesh of virtualized honeypots can be used to prevent distributed 
denial of service attacks. 
Keywords—Distributed denial of service, handler, agent, attack 
source, victim server, firewall, honeypot, virtual machines, daemon, 
behavioral analysis, challenge response, virtual network, flooding, 
crashing, intrusion detection, router, honeywall, honeymesh. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In today’s world of technology and computers, internet 
serves as a critical platform for both service providers and 
consumers. The success of any venture is critically dependent 
on reliability and continuous availability of service. Thus, it’s 
crucial for service providers to protect their servers from 
various security threats and attacks. Of all the attacks that 
hinder the availability of service, a denial of service attack 
poses maximum threat to an organization since it has direct 
effect on the service availability to a consumer.  A denial of 
service attack results in a temporary or long-term non-
availability of a service to its intended users by the way of 
either crashing a service resulting in complete non-availability 
or by flooding a server with fraudulent requests thereby 
slowing down the delivery of service to real users [1]. 
Honeypot can be used as an intrusion detection mechanism that 
can replicate some or all actions of a server and effectively 
monitor potential attackers thereby enabling the server admins 
to detect and prevent potential denial of service attacks to 
ensure a reliable and continuous service to their intended users.   
II. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
     A denial of service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make a 
service, usually one offered over internet, unavailable to its 
legitimate users [1-3]. This can result in either temporary 
interruption in service by means of overwhelming the server 
with several requests or a permanent one that causes the server 
to crash.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) 
 
     A more hazardous version of DoS is a distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attack. A distributed denial of service attack is 
the one in which intruders execute attacks from multiple 
locations rather than a single one [2]. An attacker initially 
compromises and gains control over local systems. These 
compromised systems are called handlers or masters. Masters 
are then used to further compromise systems that are close to 
the target server. These systems called as DDoS agents or 
slaves are then used to launch multiple attacks on the victim 
server [3]. In most cases, IP addresses of attack sources are 
forged to make the identification of the attacker location 
difficult. A combined effect of relaying the attack from several 
DDoS agents can potentially overwhelm the server with 
thousands of requests resulting in a slowdown or crash.  
A. Types of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
DDoS attacks are of different types depending on the kind 
of attack and the effect they have on the target server. As such 
several DDoS attacks have been identified till date. Based on 
the impact they have on the target server, DDoS attacks can be 
broadly classified into two major types namely flood attack and 
crash attack [2-3]. Flood attack involves overwhelming the 
target server with several thousand requests thereby slowing 
down the service for legitimate users [4]. On the other hand, a 
crash attack exploits the vulnerabilities in the victim server 
causing it to hang, reboot or crash. Table I summarizes various 
types of DDoS attacks and their effects. 
International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)
ISSN: 2278-0181
www.ijert.orgIJERTV4IS080325
(This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.)
Vol. 4 Issue 08, August-2015
263
TABLE I. Types of DDOS attacks 
B. Effects of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
DDOS attacks are known to disrupt services causing 
inconvenience to intended users. The effects of such attacks 
can be either temporary or permanent [3]. Typical temporary 
effects include flooding, slowdown of services, rapid 
consumption of resources, sudden spikes in processor usage 
etc. These attacks manifest themselves as temporary outages 
that cause non-availability of service for short periods of time 
[4]. On the other hand, permanent attacks are catastrophic and 
can result in server crashes, disruption of routing information, 
data corruption or in extreme cases render the server hardware 
unusable requiring complete hardware replacement. Such 
attacks can result in long term outages and can severely 
damage the reputation of an enterprise resulting in a decline of 
user trust. Thus it has become imperative to protect vulnerable 
servers against such attacks [1-4]. 
III. HONEYPOTS 
Since distributed denial of service attacks can be potentially 
harmful to a target server, it’s essential to effectively detect and 
reduce such attacks. Although absolute prevention of attacks is 
difficult, several techniques have been proposed to counter 
DDoS attacks. The two main techniques that deal with DDoS 
attacks involve mitigation of attacks and   identification of the 
attack source [4]. Honeypots can be effectively used in both of 
these cases. Fig.2 illustrates the design of a basic honeypot. 
 
Fig. 2 Basic Honeypot design 
There are several ways in which a honeypot can be defined. 
In simplest terms, a honeypot can be defined as a trap for an 
attacker that mimics some or all activities of a real system and 
records the activities of the attack source [5]. Honeypots can be 
used in a flexible manner at the server side to not only detect 
such attacks but to also protect the user’s critical data and 
record possible malicious activities so as to track the attacker.  
Honeypots can be broadly classified into two categories 
namely low interaction and high interaction honeypots [6]. 
High interaction honeypots imitate most services of real 
production systems and host a variety of tasks. They provide 
more security and are hard to detect but are relatively 
expensive to maintain. On the other hand, low interaction 
honeypots simulate services that are frequently requested by 
attackers. They consume fewer resources and can be easily 
maintained [7]. Both types of honeypots can be implemented as 
virtual machines and hosted on a single physical server [8].  
A. Existing Solutions  
Due to the potential threats posed by DDoS attacks, several 
solutions have been already proposed to deal with these threats.  
Bellovin’s ITRACE uses ICMP packets to determine the path 
of a small subset of forwarded packets enabling the victim to 
identify a compromised DDoS agent [9]. Other solutions 
include marking the path traversed by packets to determine 
their real source and reduce the number of markings by 
utilizing the topology of network maps. But these solutions are 
inefficient owing to the fact that they assume a large part of the 
network to implement them and thus they fail to address 
specific threats posed by DDoS attacks at production servers.  
Some solutions also propose the usage of honeypots to 
mitigate DDoS attacks.  Weiler proposes implementation of a 
cluster of physical honeypots servers that mimic the activities 
of real servers [10]. This solution is expensive since every 
honeypot needs a separate physical server which results in 
wastage of resources and high maintenance costs. Das proposes 
to mitigate denial of service attacks using a concept called 
“Active Servers” (AS) [11]. Every production server is hidden 
behind an AS that acts like a gateway to the production server. 
Legitimate traffic is passed on to real server while malicious 
traffic is halted. For malicious traffic, an AS acts like a 
honeypot thus protecting real server from being compromised. 
This solution is robust and secure but it slows down processing 
Ser. 
No 
Attack Effect 
1 Smurf attack Forged ICMP packets are sent to the 
destination server which responds with 
ICMP reply packets thereby flooding the 
server with fake requests and denying 
service to real users. 
2. TCP/SYN Flood The target server is sent TCP packets with 
unreachable addresses. The server wastes 
all its time and resources in determining 
the right destination causing denial of 
service to others. 
3. UDP Flood Attack This happens when the attacker sends a 
forged UDP packet to a port which 
responds with a destination unreachable 
ICMP response. This floods the system if 
several UDP packets are sent. 
4. Teardrop  Here, jumbled overlapping TCP/IP 
fragments are sent to the victim server 
which can crash the system due to 
difficulty in reassembling the overlapping 
fragments. 
5. Ping of Death In this case, the destination server is sent 
an ICMP packet much larger than its 
expected size.  The victim server is 
unable to reassemble the packet and 
crashes as a result. 
6. Land Attack This happens when an attacker sends a 
packet with identical source and 
destination addresses. This confuses the 
target server resulting in a crash. 
7. Ping Flood This is the most common of the DDOS 
attacks. Here the attacker sends repeated 
ping commands to a server resulting in 
flooding. 
8. Nuke attack The destination server is flooded with 
counterfeit ICMP packets that exploit the 
vulnerabilities of Operating systems 
causing the system to halt.  
International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)
ISSN: 2278-0181
www.ijert.orgIJERTV4IS080325
(This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.)
Vol. 4 Issue 08, August-2015
264
of requests for real users since each and every request needs to 
pass through an additional gateway. Moreover, separate 
honeypot servers for each production server wastes resources 
and is quite expensive. Also flooding attacks with thousands of 
requests can clog these gateway servers thereby greatly 
slowing down the access to production servers. This actually 
ends up aiding the attacker by slowing down the service for 
real users. Khattab proposed another solution to mitigate denial 
of service attacks where honeypots and production servers are 
frequently shuffled within the network [12]. Honeypots are 
used to detect and prevent DoS attacks. This solution is 
effective when most incoming requests are DoS requests. But if 
majority of traffic is legitimate and only few requests are DoS 
attacks, the solution is ineffective since a certain number of 
servers function as honeypots irrespective of the traffic. This 
again wastes resources and constant shuffling of honeypots and 
production servers in fact slows down service for intended 
users.  Sridhar proposes the usage of honeypots to prevent 
DDoS attacks for cloud infrastructure [13]. This solution 
proposes a network of honeypots to monitor attacker activities 
but doesn’t provide satisfactory solutions to mitigate flooding 
attacks.  
IV HONEYMESH- A NETWORK OF VIRTUALIZED 
HONEYPOTS TO PREVENT DDOS ATTACKS 
The proposed solution is to create a network of virtualized 
honeypots within the existing infrastructure with minimal cost 
and maintenance overheads. The existing security 
infrastructure consists of services such as ftp, mail, web and 
DNS that are offered to the outside world through a 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) [14]. DMZ consists of two firewalls. 
The first firewall is meant to protect these servers from external 
malicious traffic while the second one is an internal firewall 
meant to protect the organization’s internal network. The two 
firewall approach provides multiple layers of protection to the 
internal network. In addition to this, other security mechanisms 
such as encryption, host based intrusion detection systems, 
vulnerability scanners are used to bolster protection. Further, 
the organization might choose to add further protection to its 
local services using a virtual private network (VPN). These 
mechanisms contribute towards securing the network. 
However, effective detection and deflection of attacks together 
with identification of attack sources is necessary. This is 
accomplished using honeypots.   
Unlike earlier solutions that used explicit servers as 
honeypots to function as gateways and mimic a real server, the 
new solution proposes to implement honeypots as virtual 
machines (VM) that can be hosted on a few physical servers 
[15]. Since VM’s share resources, multiple honeypots can be 
hosted on a single server [16] as shown in Fig. 3.  
 Honey VM’s have security mechanisms similar to the real 
servers but some vulnerabilities are deliberately exposed so as 
to lure the attacker into a trap [5][10][13]. These VM’s 
continuously monitor the incoming traffic for potential 
malicious activities and once an attack is discovered, all the 
traffic from the attack source is routed to the honey VM 
network. This ensures that malicious traffic doesn’t reach the 
production servers. Also, each honeypot can be customized to 
mimic specific servers.  For example, one honey VM can 
mimic a file server while another can imitate a web server. This 
forms a network of virtual honeypot servers that constitutes a 
honeypot farm.   
 
Fig. 3 Honeymesh security infrastructure 
 Additionally, each of these honeypots can have backup 
VM’s that normally remain idle but can be activated the 
moment an existing honey VM is compromised by an attacker. 
This ensures that intrusion detection and deflection is not 
halted when an existing honeypot is compromised by a DDoS 
attack.  This arrangement functions like a hybrid honeypot 
network that mimics the functionalities of real servers similar 
to high interaction honeypots while consuming fewer resources 
just like low interaction honeypots [16]. 
      As opposed to the solution proposed by Das where separate 
honeypot servers’ function as gateways to individual 
production servers [11], the gateway honeypot can run as a 
daemon process within the server itself. This honeypot 
daemon, abbreviated as honey-d, works like a gateway and 
performs initial authentication before passing on the 
information to the actual server. Thus even if the honey farm 
fails to detect an attack, honey daemon present within the 
server provides an additional layer of security. This, together 
with the hybrid network of honey VM’s functions like a mesh 
of virtualized honeypots and ensures effective detection and 
prevention of possible DDoS attacks. 
A. Detection of an Attack 
     Honeypot VM’s in the honey farm employ machine 
learning algorithms to perform a behavioral analysis of 
incoming traffic [18]. Since each production server receives 
different types of requests, appropriate honey VM’s can be 
tailored for the corresponding servers. For example, one honey 
VM can analyze web server traffic while another can examine 
file server requests. After analyzing a few thousand requests, 
each honey VM generates a baseline model of expected traffic. 
Incoming requests are compared against the baseline. If any 
deviation is observed, further probing is necessary to confirm if 
the request actually constitutes a DDoS attack.  
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     Once the honeypot suspects a particular request based on 
behavioral analysis, it needs to verify that the suspicious 
request is actually a DDoS attack. For this, the honey VM then 
employs a challenge-response model to gather more 
information. This is accomplished by sending a set of challenge 
queries to suspicious source [19]. Based on the responses 
received, the honey VM decides whether further investigation 
is necessary. If yes, more sophisticated challenges are sent to 
the source. Based on the responses received and an intelligent 
behavioral mechanism, the honey VM can conclude whether 
the requests constitute a DDoS attack. This process is fully 
automated and happens without human intervention thereby 
guaranteeing excellent service for legitimate users. 
     Similar mechanisms can be built into the honey daemons 
that run on production servers. This ensures that even if the 
honey farm misses out on a potential attack, it is reexamined by 
honey-d’s running on respective servers. This provides an 
additional level of authentication and intrusion detection. 
B. Preventing Flooding Attacks 
 Once an attack is discovered, the routing information in the 
internal routers is modified so as to redirect all incoming traffic 
from the attack source to the honey farm. Since malicious 
traffic now flows to the honey farm, it ensures that the 
production network is shielded from flooding attacks. Honey 
VM’s in the farm keep the attacker engaged through a set of 
challenge-response queries further slowing down the attacker 
[19]. Also, once the attack source is confirmed, all incoming 
traffic from that source is blocked at the firewall itself. This 
mechanism mitigates the impact of flooding attacks to a great 
extent. 
C. Preventing Crashing Attacks 
     Unlike flooding attacks that cause short term outages and 
slowdown of services, crashing attacks manipulate 
vulnerabilities in production servers causing data corruption, 
theft of confidential information, server crashes and reboots 
causing long term outages [4]. Thus, preventing such attacks 
requires additional intelligence in honey VM’s and daemons.  
     For this purpose, each VM in the honey farm is made to 
mimic most services of real servers and implement most 
security mechanisms provided for real servers. This lures the 
attacker into believing that interactions are happening with real 
servers [5][6][10][13]. The VM then sets a trap for the attacker 
by deliberately exposing some flaws in its security mechanism 
to fool the attacker into thinking that a DDoS attack has 
succeeded. Meanwhile, the VM tracks the attack source 
through a challenge-response mechanism and further requests 
from the attack source are blocked by the firewall.  
     Since a honey VM exposes some security flaws to the 
attacker, there’s a chance that the VM can be compromised or 
crash in worst case scenarios. The new design proposes to 
maintain backup VM’s that can immediately take charge if the 
current VM is compromised. By maintaining a pool of backup 
VM’s, we can ensure continued intrusion detection and 
prevention. Also since the compromised honeypot is a VM, it 
can be easily restored with minimal cost [17].  
 
 
 Fig. 4 illustrates a typical sequence of events that occur in 
the honey mesh while detecting and preventing DDoS attacks. 
 
Fig. 4 Honeymesh sequence flow 
D. Advantages and Future Enhancements 
The proposed solution of preventing DDoS attacks by 
creating a mesh of honey VM’s and honey daemons has 
several advantages over the existing solutions. These 
advantages include: 
 Since honeypots are implemented as virtual machines and 
daemon processes rather than actual physical servers, this 
solution is economical and has low maintenance costs 
[17]. 
 Also, each honey VM is backed up by additional VM’s. 
This ensures continuous intrusion detection and 
prevention even if an existing VM is compromised. 
 Restoring a compromised VM is very cheap and has 
minimum downtime [17]. 
 The mesh of honey VM’s and daemons provides multiple 
layers of security against DDoS attacks. Even if honey 
VM’s in the honey farm miss out a possible attack, it can 
be caught by honey-d’s running on individual servers. 
This authentication provides enhanced security to the 
production servers. 
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 Since malicious traffic is routed to the honey farm, actual 
production servers and network lines are protected from 
flooding.  
 Challenge response and behavioral analysis by honeypots 
ensures effective intrusion detection and prevention of 
crashing attacks [18-19]. 
 
Despite all the advantages mentioned, the proposed 
solution has a few shortcomings which have been stated as 
below: 
 Although production servers and organization’s internal 
network (LAN) are fully protected, there should be a 
mechanism to protect the organization’s routers from 
being flooded with malicious requests. 
 Honeypot VM’s may be hosted on a network of servers to 
create a more robust honey farm. Currently, all VM’s in 
the honey farm are hosted on a single server to reduce 
maintenance and recovery costs. 
 Honeywalls where the honeypot logic is embedded within 
the firewall itself can be implemented. 
 
Although the solution has a few shortcomings as 
mentioned above, honeymesh is very robust and provides 
multiple levels of security checks and intrusion detection 
mechanisms to effectively detect deflect and prevent possible 
DDoS attacks. Also, the above shortcomings can be addressed 
in future enhancements of the proposed solution.  
V CONCLUSION 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are dangerous 
and can potentially render the production site unusable either 
by flooding the server network with thousands of malicious 
requests or crashing the server by exploiting the vulnerabilities 
in its software. Several solutions have been proposed to deal 
with DDoS attacks. However, these solutions are either 
expensive due to usage of multiple physical servers for 
honeypots or do not successfully address the issue of flooding 
type of DDoS attacks. The new solution proposes to create a 
virtual network or mesh of honeypot VM’s and honey daemon 
processes to provide multiple levels of security checks and 
intrusion detection using behavioral analysis and challenge-
response models. Also, malicious traffic is routed to honey 
farm thereby protecting the production server and internal 
networks from both crashing and flooding type of DDoS 
attacks. Honeymesh when integrated with existing security 
infrastructure such as firewalls, encryption, authentication 
services, virtual private network (VPN) etc. can protect the 
server network from any kind of DDoS attacks. As already 
stated, the solution does have a few shortcomings which can be 
addressed in future enhancements to this solution. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Christos Douligeris and Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, "DDoS attacks and 
defense mechanisms: classification and state-of-the-art", Computer 
Networks: The Int. Journal of Computer and Telecommunications 
Networking, vol. 44, no. 5, Apr. 2004, pp. 643–666. 
[2] Stephen M. Specht and Ruby B. Lee, "Distributed Denial of Service: 
Taxonomies of Attacks, Tools and Countermeasures”, Proceedings of 
the 17th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing 
Systems, September 2004, pp. 543-550.  
[3] J Mirkovic, and P Reiher, “A taxonomy of DDoS attack and DDoS 
defense mechanisms”,  ACM SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev. 34, 
2004, pp. 39–53. 
[4] S.T. Zargar, J. Joshi, and D. Tipper, “ A Survey of Defense Mechanisms 
Against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Flooding Attacks”,  IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, January 2013, pp. 2046–2069, 
[5] R.C. Joshi and A. Sardana, "Honeypots: A New Paradigm to 
Information Security", Science Publishers,2011 
[6] L. Spitzner, "Honeypots: Tracking Hackers", Addison-Wesley 
Proffesional, 2002. 
[7] K. Cabaj and  P Gawkowski, “HoneyPot systems in practice”,  Przeglad 
Elektrotechniczny, Sigma NOT 91(2), 2015, pp. 63–67. 
[8] Matthew L. Bringer, Christopher A. Chelmecki, and Hiroshi Fujinoki, 
“A Survey: Recent Advances and Future Trends in Honeypot Research”, 
I. J. Computer Network and Information Security, 2012, pp. 63-75. 
[9] S. M. Bellovin, “ICMP Traceback Messages Internet Draft: draft-
bellovin-itrace-00.txt”, Mar. 2000. 
[10] Natalie Weiler, “ Honeypots for distributed denial-of-service attacks”, 
Proceedings of Eleventh IEEE International Worksops on Enabling 
Technologies, 2002. 
[11] Vinu V. Das, “Honeypot Scheme for Distributed Denial-of-Service”, 
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Advanced 
Computer Control, January 2009, pp. 497-501. 
[12] Sherif M. Khattab, Chatree Sangpachatanaruk, Daniel Moss, Rami 
Melhem and Taieb Znati, “Roaming Honeypots for Mitigating Service-
Level Denial-of-Service Attacks”, Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Distributed Systems, March 2004, pp. 328–337. 
[13] Kumar Shridhar and Nikhil Gautam, “A Prevention of DDos Attacks in 
Cloud Using Honeypot “, International Journal of Science and Research, 
Volume 3 Issue 11, November 2014, pp. 2378-2383. 
[14] E. Dart, L. Rotman, B. Tierney, M. Hester, and J. Zurawski, “The 
science dmz:: A network design pattern for data-intensive science.”, 
Proceedings of  IEEE/ACM Annual SuperComputing Conference 
(SC13), Denver CO, USA, 2013. 
[15] Xuxian Jiang and Xinyuan Wang, "Out-of-theBox Monitoring of VM-
Based High-Interaction Honeypots", Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, September 
2007, pp. 198-218. 
[16] Yu Adachi and Yoshihiro Oyama,  “Malware Analysis System using 
Process-Level Virtualization”, Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on 
Computers and Communications, July 2009, pp. 550-556. 
[17] James Smith and Ravi Nair, "The Architecture of Virtual Machines",  
IEEE Computer Society, 2005, pp. 32-38. 
[18] YiZhang, QiangLiu and Guofeng Zhao, “A Real-Time DDoS Attack 
Detection and Prevention System Based on per-IP Traffic Behavioral 
Analysis”, IEEE 3rd International Conference on Computer Science and 
Information Technology (ICCSIT ’10), April  2010, pp. 163–167. 
[19] Aamir, M. and Arif, M., "Study and performance evaluation on recent 
DDoS trends of attack & defense",  International Journal of Information 
Technology and Computer Science, 2013, pp. 54–65. 
 
 
International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)
ISSN: 2278-0181
www.ijert.orgIJERTV4IS080325
(This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.)
Vol. 4 Issue 08, August-2015
267
